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INTRODUCTION

How should the contribution of a legislator be measured? The thesis of
this festschrift article is that appropriate performance criteria, akin to a
baseball player's statistics, can describe and assess a legislative career. While
such criteria may lack the precision of the athlete's numbers, they can serve
well enough to help locate the overall performance of a legislator along a
meaningful continuum-serving as a cat's paw of special interest groups at
one end and being an effective representative of the public interest at the
other.
Representative Kastenmeier emerges at the end of the spectrum that
describes the ideal public servant. Setting aside the complex elements of
voter satisfaction, a legislator may be assessed in an arena of peer
professionals. It is this latter aspect of his record that is the focus of this
essay. From the perspective of an academic copyright lawyer, a legislator may
be judged on his mastery of the substantive material, on his aptitude for
asserting the public interest among special interest proposals, and by his
ethical standards. On all these counts, Kastenmeier is entitled to high marks.
II
LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

The task of crafting legislative performance criteria necessarily begins with
the legislative process itself and with the substantial literature that it has
generated. Since early in this century, the structure and function of the
legislative body in a democratic society has long been the object of scholarly
attention by political scientists and economists.' There is a reprise of this
basic literature in the current writings of law teachers applying public choice
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theory. 2 To the extent that this varied literature has a common theme, it is
the continuous concern with the impact of special interest groups. While
there is consensus within this literature on the potentially corrosive effect of
special interest lobbying, this literature has not produced a general theory to
explain or predict the dynamics of the formation and the effect of special
interest activity.
The initial work was done by political scientists who studied the influence
of special interest groups on specific legislation.3 As the literature developed,
the several disciplines began to construct models and prepare case studies of
the involvement of special interest groups in the legislative process
generally. 4 Some of these writers concluded that the legislature functioned as
an arena in which special interests are competitors for the attention of the
elected representatives. 5 Recent federal income tax legislation has been
described in such terms:
[We] see important institutions-Congress, the Treasury, the business lobbying
forces, even the outgunned public policy advocates-at work. ... Congress,
especially
6
is often like a seamless web of floating coalitions.
the House ....

The current political science writing rejects as without empirical
foundation the conclusion of the earlier writers who viewed special interest
7
groups as merely reflecting the pluralistic dispersion of power in society.
From that earlier perspective, the interaction of the interest groups tended to
resolve policy differences by an equilibrium solution that provided sound
public policy. Current data show that interest groups form and function
largely to support business interests, leaving substantial segments of society
unrepresented. Accordingly, special interest groups are more likely to

2. For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory
Justify More IntrusiveJudicialReview?, 101 Yale LJ 31, 35-44 (1991). See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip
P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction ch 1 (U Chicago Press, 1991).
3. Elmer E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures, and The Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in
Pressure Politics, as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tariff (Prentice-Hall, 1935) (documenting the

influence of special interest groups on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930).
4. William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Collations (Yale U Press, 1962); James Q. Wilson,
Political Organizations ch 15 (Basic Books, 1973); Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying for the People: The Political
Behavior of Interest Groups (Princeton U Press, 1977); Andrew S. McFarland, Common Cause. Lobbying in

the Public Interest (Chatham House Publishers, 1984).
5. For this perspective, "[t]he legislature referees the group struggle, ratifies the victories of
the successful coalitions, and records the terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in
the form of statutes ....
What may be called public policy is the equilibrium reached in this struggle
... it represents a balance which the contending factions of groups constantly strive to weight in their
favor."

Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-Point Legislation 35-37 (Cornell U

Press, 1952).
6.

Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown At Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the

Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform xv, 16-17 (Random House, 1988). For a comprehensive, critical
analysis of public choice theory applied to federal income tax legislation, see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond
Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as illustratedby Tax Legislation in the 1980s,

139 U Pa L Rev 1 (1990).
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dominate business-related legislation. 8 Interest groups do not interact to
achieve optimal public policy solutions.
Current political science literature directly examines the impact of special
interest lobbying on specific legislation. This approach identifies winners and
losers by examining the costs and benefits that specific legislation has
imposed or conferred on various groups in society.
Some policies-for example, social security, Medicare, or national defense-confer

benefits on large numbers of persons at a cost that all or most of society must pay....
Sometimes policies confer benefits on one narrowly concentrated, identifiable group
and impose costs on another narrowly concentrated, identifiable group. For example,
when Congress approves subsidies to sugar beet farmers, it creates benefits for some9
farmers but imposes higher production costs on candy and soft drink manufacturers.

Unlike the earlier approach that considered the legislator a passive broker
among the special interest groups, the recent literature emphasizes the
interaction between the legislator and the interest groups. The elected
representative is a material actor who participates in the legislative process by
performing various alternative roles.
[The legislator] can seek . . . a reputation as a national leader [or] work at press
relations.... be a local civic leader.., or make a reputation in the field of legislation
... or conduct investigations ....
The one thing the [legislator] cannot do is much of
all these things. [The legislator] must choose among them ... to be a certain kind of
congressman.l°
The law and economics writers reinforce this perception of the legislator as a
rational, maximizing actor. In their terms,
[legislators are] not . . . mere . . . brokers [acting] in response to competing private
demands, but [are] independent actors making their own demands to which private

actors respond ....
Political office confers a property right, not just to legislate rents,
but to impose costs. A politician can gain by forebearing from exercising his right to
impose burdensome restrictions on private actors.i I

This cursory summary of the contemporary literature suggests two
relevant criteria for assessing a legislator's contribution. First, the measures
enacted during the legislator's tenure must be parsed to determine whether
specific, narrow group goals were systematically achieved to the detriment of
the public interest. This review would include hearings, committee reports,
and statements in the Congressional Record. The events leading to the
enactment of various measures must be studied as well as all versions of the
bills as they moved toward enactment.
The second criteria for assessing a legislator's contribution complements
and may be merged with the first. The role of the legislator should not be
8.

Kay L. Schlozman &John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy 82-87 (Harper

& Row, 1986) (concluding on the basis of an exhaustive empirical study of special interest groups
that (1) special interest representation is not limited to the legislative process, but functions also in
campaign financing and related aspects of electoral politics, and (2) activity at the legislative level
must be considered in terms of specific legislation).
9. Id at 83-84.
10. Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool & Lewis A. Dexter, American Business and Public Policy:
the Politics of Foreign Trade 406-07 (Atherton Press, 2d ed 1972).
1I.
Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J

Legal Studies 101, 102 (1987).
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reviewed from the paper trail of legislation alone, but also from the
"testimony" of the legislator and other participants. The objective is to
characterize the conduct of the legislator in examining, questioning, rejecting,
modifying, or following special 'interest positions in relation to the public
interest. Here it would be necessary to speak with staff members, lobbyists,
and other participants in shaping the legislation. Where it is not practical to
obtain a full record of events, reliance has to be made on the best evidence
rule.
III
SPECIAL INTEREST LEGISLATION

An appropriate starting place to review Congressman Kastenmeier's
performance is the copious paper record generated by the hearings leading to
the Copyright Act of 1976.12 From these hearings, it is apparent that special
interest groups pervaded the legislative process; interest group
representatives appeared and testified on virtually every topic. 1 3 Indeed,
Congressman Kastenmeier himself commented during the course of the
hearings that "all interests in this bill were in one form or another, special
interests." 14
This should not be considered an "admission" of the subservient role of
Congressman Kastenmeier to the special interests in copyright legislation,
however. Copyright law itself is "special interest" in nature. Unlike
environmental protection legislation, for example, which is designed to insure
interests of the population as a whole, copyright law began and remains to
protect the interests of a select segment of society as part of a larger design of
5
serving the public interest.'
Moreover, copyright legislation is characterized by a limited institutional
support structure which provides the legislator with only limited institutional
assistance in determining the public interest in a given special interest
proposal. For example, as compared to a legislator on a tax writing
committee, the copyright legislator has fewer staff and less alternative
institutional assistance in discerning the public interest on a given issue.' 6 To
be sure, the copyright issues are fewer than those involving the Internal
Revenue Code and its some seven thousand provisions, but the substantial
difference in support is disproportionately less for copyright legislation.
12.

17 USC §§ 101 et seq (1991).

13. See Hearings on HR 2223 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong, 1st Sess (1975). See also
Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L Rev 857 (1987).
14. Hearings on HR 2223 at 1853 (cited in note 13). See also Litman, 72 Cornell L Rev at 870
(cited in note 13).
15. See note 24 and accompanying text.
16. As part of the Library of Congress, the Copyright Office has five operating divisions
concerned with processing copyright registrations and small legal staffs of about a dozen lawyers in
two of the divisions: the General Counsel's Office and the Policy Planning Advisors. See The United
States Government Manual 56 (1990/91).
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The legislator on the House or Senate committee dealing with copyright
has only the support of other agencies of the legislative branch, the Copyright
Office, and the Office of Technology Assessment, to assist in defining the
public interest in the welter of industry presentations. In addition, the
copyright committee has the power to appoint a national study commission as
was done in 1979 to address the issue of protection of new technologies,
including computer programs.' 7 By comparison, a legislator on a House or
Senate tax writing committee is assisted in defining the public interest by the
executive branch, both the White House and the Treasury, as well as by
legislative branch organizations such as the Joint Committee on Taxation and
the Congressional Budget Office.
While this legislative framework places more responsibility on the
individual legislator in determining the public interest in matters of copyright,
the structure of the copyright statute itself fosters the formation of special
interest groups by its descriptions of protected interests. Historically, the
copyright statute had been "class" legislation affecting the immediate
economic interests of creative persons. The general public welfare is the
derivative beneficiary of copyright legislation; the creators of the works are
8
the immediate beneficiaries.'
By identifying the work products of the creative segments of society, the
copyright statute facilitates the formation of special interest groups. Thus, for
example, by extending protection to eight kinds of creative works, Section
102 of the Copyright Act 19 identifies the persons whose works are protected
and provides an incentive for these individuals to organize in order to
maximize the scope of protection.
This statutory foundation also shapes the relationship of these groups to
the legislator. As each interest group presses its position, another group
usually presents a countervailing proposal. Thus, some group claims will be
met only at the expense of other groups. For example, amending the statute
to deprive state institutions of the protection of sovereign immunity in cases
of copyright infringement advances the interests of authors of computer
software programs at the expense of state universities and other state
agencies .20

Given this context, the legislative hearings on copyright matters are
essentially adversarial. The legislator serves first as a referee and ultimately as
the gatekeeper of the public interest. In this second role, the legislator must
assess, select, modify, or reject these competing claims in accord with his own
17. See Final Report, National Commission on New Technological Uses ("CONTU") of
Copyrighted Works 13-19 (1979) ("Commission's Final Report").
18. See note 24 and accompanying text.
19. Literary works (including computer programs), musical works and their lyrics, dramatic
works, including accompanying music, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works (including maps), motion pictures and other audiovisuals, sound recordings, and
architectural works. 17 USC §§ 102(a)(l)-(8) (1990).
20. Congress exercised its right to abrogate the sovereign immunity of states from liability for
money damages for copyright infringement in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990, Pub
L No 101-553, 104 Stat 2749 (1990).
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determination of the public interest. Since special interest groups originate in
the copyright statute itself, copyright representatives, unlike special interest
representatives in trade legislation, environmental protection, and federal
income taxation, for example, have more clearly defined channels in which to
protect or expand their statutory turf. Although the scope and number of
issues may be smaller than in these other legislative arenas, the pressures are
no less intense.
The significance of the interest groups being identified by the statute is
underscored by a comparison with the Internal Revenue Code. Unlike the
copyright statute, which was designed to serve a special segment of society,
the Internal Revenue Code is a statute designed to touch and concern all
2
citizens. Citizenship is its only criterion of jurisdiction. '
The statutory objective of the tax code is to impose the tax burden fairly
on each income group. 22 The Code reflects this objective by operative
provisions written in broad, generic terms. This general statutory framework
provides the objective for special interest groups to form, to define their own
interests in the narrowest terms, and to unite in a concerted effort to bend and
distort the code's general language for the benefit of that particular group of
taxpayers. Thus, in most cases, the identification and impetus for lobbying
groups to form is entirely external to the Code. For example, timber and
other resource interest groups are essentially defined by geography; banks
and insurance interests are defined by their function and by their discrete
regulatory legislation. Trade associations are formed in the unregulated
sectors of the economy by function, for example, associations of farmers,
manufacturers, and motion picture producers. The lobbyists' handiwork is
reflected in the multitude of special interest exceptions to the general
provisions of the Code. As one commentator has described this process,
[individuals who appear before [Congress] hardly represent a cross section of opinion
on tax matters ....
The result is that, day after day, the committees are subject to a
drumfire of complaints against the tax system, arguments against the elimination of
special tax advantages, and reasons for additional preferences. . . . Whether taxes are
to be raised or lowered, most of the
witnesses find good reason for favoring the
23
groups or individuals they represent.

Conversely, because copyright legislation was structured by Congress to
grant protection to certain creative activities deemed consistent with the
public interest, 24 the ubiquitous presence of special interest groups in
intellectual property legislation takes on less of a pejorative connotation.
21.

Cook v Tait, 265 US 47, 56 (1924) (U.S. citizens may be taxed on their world-wide income by

virtue of their citizenship).
22. Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 63 (Brookings Inst, 5th ed 1987).

23.

Id at 55.

24. In Sony Corp. ofAmerica v Universal City Studios, 464 US 417, 429 (1984), the Court identified
this balance as follows:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius ....
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Indeed, Congressman Kastenmeier voiced this sentiment during the hearings
on the 1976 Act in a colloquy with the Register, when he said in response to
her use of the phrase "special interest," "I do not think we should use the
25
term 'special interest' in the derogatory sense."
While too much should not be made of the distinction between the
formation and function of special interest groups under these two statutes,
the comparison illuminates the differences in the manner in which the
legislator in each arena is subject to influence, and aids in the assessment of
each legislator's performance. The tax lobbyist appeals to the legislator to
modify a particular Code section or general statutory policy in order to attain
a departure from the statutory norm for the benefit of the claimant group. 26
Thus, the tax lobbyists direct their efforts to the legislator in terms of a
particular resource, enterprise, or geographic factor. In the typical case, one
lobbyist's objective is not opposed by another lobbying group because
favorable tax treatment for one class of taxpayers need not directly affect any
other interest group. Generally, the cost of selective, favorable tax treatment
for one group of taxpayers is reflected in lost revenue by the Treasury and the
correlative departure from the principle of tax equity.
By comparison, the pursuit of special interest in the copyright arena is
more of a zero-sum game. Treating hospital room displays as public
performances requiring payment of royalties favors owners of audio visuals by
imposing costs on hospital patients. Thus, a diagrammatic representation of
the relationship of the tax lobbyist to the legislator would show a single line of
advocacy moving from the lobbyist to the legislator. 2 7 In some cases, tax
lobbyists form a coalition so that there would be multiple lines from several
lobbyists advocating the same modification; for example, the timber interest
lobbyist may form a coalition with other groups either along resource lines
(coal, natural gas, or oil) or result lines, such as receiving preferential
amortization deductions for a group of resources. Thus, in both focus and
direction, the tax lobbyists differ from their copyright counterparts.
The lines of persuasion originating with the copyright lobbyist also move
to the legislator initially, but typically energize opposing interest groups.
Thus the diagrammatic representation would show a line of advocacy from
the lobbyist to the legislator as well as a countervailing line of advocacy from
the affected group to the legislator. Accordingly, as noted above, the
copyright legislator is cast in the role of a referee between these adversaries,
at least in the first instance. For example, when during the 1976 revision the
25. Hearings on HR 2223 at 1853 (cited in note 13).
26. Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70
Harv L Rev 1145, 1146-47 (1957). The role of special interest groups formed to protect a given
industry is noted in the deliberations surrounding the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as follows: "The
Packwood package retained existing law for almost every tax break associated with the timber,
mining, agriculture, and oil and gas industries." Birnbaum & Murray, Showdown At Gucci Gulch at 199
(cited in note 6).
27. One commentator has characterized tax lobbyists as "being brought down by the
narrowness of their vision." Birnbaum & Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch at 287 (cited in note 6).
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educational establishment as users sought an express statutory exemption
permitting multiple copying for classroom use, the publishers' representatives
appeared in opposition. 2 8 Publishers' representatives again appeared in
opposition when the semiconductor chip industry sought protection under
the copyright statute with an expanded definition of "fair use" under the
broader rubric of "reverse engineering." 29 As part of this same process, the
deliberations over the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 199030

elicited controversy among the video game manufacturers, the rental store
owners, and the video game operators.
IV
IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

A proper assessment of the performance of a copyright legislator should
take into account the other aspect of the constitutional mandate: to provide
an incentive to create for the benefit of society as a whole. 3 ' Thus, copyright
legislators should not be evaluated for their involvement with special interest
legislation. Rather, their conduct in pursuing the public interest among the
welter of competing narrow interest claims should be examined.
To accomplish this task, "public interest" must be defined in the copyright
context. Here, too, the Internal Revenue Code serves as a useful benchmark.
The public interest in tax legislation may be identified in terms of the
dynamics described above, as diagrammed vectors of forces in which the force
of special interest ultimately impinges on the federal revenue as the surrogate
for the public interest.
Given the institutional machinery of the legislative process set out earlier,
the tax legislative process routinely attaches the dollar value of the impact of a
proposed piece of tax legislation on the federal revenues. A proposed change
that reduces revenue and breaches the principle of tax equity is considered
32
inimical to the public interest.
28. As the Ad Hoc Committee on Educational Institutions on Copyright Revision urged a
specific statutory exemption for multiple copying by classroom teachers, the Association of American
Publishers, Inc., and the Authors' League of America, Inc., appeared in opposition. The course of
the subsequent negotiations and the guidelines reflecting the ultimate agreement among these
interest groups is described in Ralph S. Brown & Robert C. Denicola, Copyright 353-60 (Foundation
Press, 5th ed 1990).
29. See statements ofJon Baumgarten on behalf of the Association of American Publishers, Inc.,
in S Rep No 425, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 22 (1984).
30. Pub L No 101-650, 104 Stat 5134 (1990). See also H Rep No 101-735, 101st Cong, 2d Sess
15-17 (1990).
31. See note 24.
32. The literature of tax policy identifies special interest provisions as private subsidies
inconsistent with the public interest being given outside the traditional congressional process of
dealing with appropriation measures. As one commentator put it,
[t]he tax subsidies tumble into the law without supporting studies, being propelled instead
by cliches, debating points, and scraps of data and tables that are passed off as serious
evidence. A tax system that is so vulnerable to this injection of extraneous, costly, and illconsidered expenditure programs is in a precarious state from the standpoint of the basic
tax goals of providing adequate revenues and maintaining tax equity.
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Unfortunately, no such refined definition of "public interest" exists for
copyright legislation. A recent survey of the economic literature of
intellectual property notes the absence of any data showing the efficiency of
the incentive created by the patent and copyright statutes. s3 A legislator in
the copyright arena must look instead to a framework of general postulates
provided by various informed commentators. For example, Benjamin Kaplan
counsels that copyright legislation take account of all interests and be
sensitive to changing technology.3 4 David Lange similarly urges legislators to
impose the duty of demonstrating a meritorious public purpose on
proponents of special treatment. According to Lange, the stated purpose
should be required to pass muster under a broader, multi-part test.35 Lange's
framework was adopted in substantial measure by Congressman Kastenmeier
and his staff counsel in explaining the development of the legislation to
protect the semiconductor chip industry. 36 Richard Stern has subsequently
refined such general criteria by suggesting that Congress establish guidelines
of intellectual property protection for new technologies, but delegate the task
of identifying eligible technologies to an executive branch agency for
formulation of the specifics of protection.3 7 Stern's approach would serve
better to tailor the protective legislation to the new technology and enable
Congress to take account of the needs of a particular industry. Ralph Brown
has pointed out that in extending protection to new technologies, Congress
should be sensitive to the inherent tensions between the rights of the author,
38
the public interest, and the concept of a full, free market for these rights.
From these general postulates, Representative Kastenmeier and his staff
counsel have constructed a four-part test for identifying the public interest in
proposed intellectual property legislation. First, the proposed legislation
must be compatible with the principles and concepts of the existing statutory
framework. Second, the proponent must provide a workable definition of the
proposed subject matter of protection, including a statement of permissible,
non-infringing uses. Third, the proponent must furnish a cost/benefit
analysis of the impact of the new protection. Finally, the proponent must
The Economy of Federal Subsidy Programs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 92nd Cong, 1st Sess 48, 49 (1972)
(statement of Stanley S. Surrey).
33.

Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual

Property, 5 J Econ Perspectives 3, 4 (1991). But see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J Legal Studies 325 (1989).
34. Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright: Proposals and Prospects, 66 Colum L Rev 831,

854 (1966).
35. Copyright and Technological Change, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Committee on theJudiciary, 98th Cong, 1st
Sess 57-58, 65-68 (1983) (statement of David Lange) ("Hearings on Copyright and Technological
Change").
36. Robert W. Kastenmeier & MichaelJ, Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984:
A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 Minn L Rev 417, 440-42 (1985).
37. Richard H. Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U Pitt L Rev 1229, 1262-67

(1986).
38.

Ralph S. Brown, Eligibilityfor Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn L

Rev 579 (1985).
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identify a material contribution of the legislation to the community stock of
knowledge, that is, to the public domain. 39 Overall, the last criterion is
dispositive of the decision by the legislator to support the proposal. As
Kastenmeier and his counsel put it, "[flrom a larger political perspective, the
greatest betrayal that could ever occur is that Congress would confer
protection above and beyond that necessary to stimulate a desired creative
40
activity."
Representative Kastenmeier's conduct in achieving these stated objectives
can be assessed from the substantial paper trail generated by the legislative
process. The 1976 Act, given the extended duration of the deliberations,
produced a voluminous legislative history consisting of hearings,
commissioned studies, and Copyright Office position papers. 4 1 The Chip Act
followed this general pattern of extensive hearings. 42 Representative
Kastenmeier and his committee have also utilized the Office of Technology
Assessment to obtain information. 4 3 Special commissions and oversight
44
hearings round out the congressional techniques for information gathering.
Taking the 1976 Copyright Act and the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
together shows that the congressman and his committee applied both
informative and deliberative legislative techniques in developing these
measures.
Distilling the conduct of Congressman Kastenmeier through the prism of
the hearings on the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act shows his inclination
to seek consensus between and among competing interests. During the
course of the deliberations over almost all of the copyright legislation,
beginning with the revision, Representative Kastenmeier has responded in the
same manner. As one interest group urged its position on a given issue only
to be opposed by another interest group, the parties were sent to resolve their
differences by compromise. 4 5 It is clear that seeking consensus among
39. Kastenmeier & Remington, 70 Minn L Rev at 440-42 (cited in note 36).
40. Id at 460. This objective is also stated in Commission's Final Report at 13-19 (cited in note
17).
41. See the eighteen volumes compiled by George S. Grossman, Omnibus Copyright Revision
Legislative History (Hein, 1976). Congress also utilized industry and legal expertise in dealing with
copyright protection of computers by establishing CONTU. See generally Commission's Final
Report (cited in note 17).
42. See generally Symposium, The Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct and Its Lessons, 70 Minn L Rev
263 (1985).
43. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age
of Electronics and Information (1986).
44. Computers and Intellectual Property, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
101st Cong, 1st & 2nd Sess (Nov 8, 1989, March 7, 1990) ("Hearings on Computers and Intellectual
Property").
45. In her careful review of the legislative history, Jessica Litman notes that "[tihe statute's
legislative history is troubling because it reveals that most of the statutory language was not drafted
by members of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the language evolved through a process of
negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property
rights the statute defines." See Litman, 72 Cornell L Rev at 860-61 (cited in note 13).
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opposing groups is a strategy of this representative. 46 However, the record
also shows that Representative Kastenmeier served as more than a passive
referee. Professor Litman's description of congressional conduct based on
her thorough and thoughtful review of the legislative history of the 1976 Act,
can fairly be taken as a description of the conduct of the congressman when
she writes,
Congress consistently resisted lobbying over substantive issues, insisting instead that
would-be lobbyists sit down with their opponents and seek mutually acceptable
solutions. Members of Congress worked very hard on the copyright revision bill. They
held repeated, lengthy subcommittee hearings, attended numerous executive sessions,
and drafted a flood of committee reports. More important, they encouraged, cajoled,
bullied, and threatened the parties through continuing negotiations. They mediated
disputes and demanded that combative interests seek common ground. Viable
compromises emerged 4from
the interminable negotiations largely because of
7
congressional midwifery.

One example of Congressman Kastenmeier's conduct conforming to the
above description is illustrated by his colloquy during the hearings with a
representative of thejuke box industry, in which he pressed the spokesperson
48
to state the economic consequences of his proposal.
Congressman Kastenmeier and the committee also required special
interest groups to arrive at a compromise solution balancing public and
private interests in the development of the guidelines on multiple copying by
educational institutions. 49 The special statutory exemption for reproduction
by libraries and archives was also reached through negotiation. 50 In this case,
the statute incorporated a provision requiring the Register periodically to
report to Congress on the success of the compromise. 51 These examples
support the conclusion that Representative Kastenmeier was sensitive to and
vigorous in asserting the need for recognition of the public interest during the
1976 revision.
His approach of seeking consensus and balancing public and private
interests is also reflected in subsequent legislation. The issue of moral rights
serves as an example. Deliberately omitted in the 1976 revision and
vigorously resisted during the deliberations of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act in 1988, Congress has since yielded to pressure for a
variant of moral rights protection for visual artists. Congress has reacted to
46. In a recent lecture, Representative Kastenmeier outlined his approach to copyright
legislation for new technology:
There will be growing reliance on special reports, technological assessments, private
negotiations and perhaps national study commissions ....
Consensus will be the rule
rather than the exception.
Robert W. Kastenmeier, Copyright In An Era Of Technological Change: A Political Perspective, 14 Colum-

VLAJ L & Arts 1, 24 (1989).
47. Litman, 72 Cornell L Rev at 871 (cited in note 13) (citations omitted).
48. Hearings on HR 2223 at 426-27 (cited in note 13).
49. Id at 294-95. See also Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change at 57-58, 65-68
(cited in note 35).
50. 17 USC § 108(i) (1990).
51. See Report of the Register of Copyrights: Library Reproduction of Copyrighted Works
(1988).
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this in a minimal fashion by extending rights of attribution and integrity to a
restricted number of works of visual art, but as legislation separate and apart
from Berne considerations. 52 Congressman Kastenmeier noted the limited
53
scope of this new protection.
Aside from striving for consensus and for recognition of the public interest
by special interest representatives, Representative Kastenmeier deserves
credit for taking initiatives in the public interest in the absence of special
interest prodding. For example, when a recent Fourth Circuit decision
announced a clearly perverse interpretation of the first-sale doctrine that
effectively barred domestic purchasers of video game electronic equipment
from applying the purchased item to the intended use, the Congressman took
54
the initiative in legislatively overruling the decision.
A similar exercise of initiative in the public interest by Kastenmeier is his
use of oversight hearings to evaluate the effectiveness of recent legislation.
For example, in response to a rising volume of software patent applications
that breached the earlier understanding of exclusive copyright protection for
software, the Congressman organized hearings to "stimulate debate and to
promote understanding, rather than to resolve controversies among
55
competing interests."
While overall the evidence supports a finding of exemplary conduct by
Congressman Kastenmeier, the record is not without its negative side. There
have been occasional lapses, which must be charged to the chairman since
they occurred on his watch. Ralph Brown points out that,
Congress ...sometimes does no more than respond to pressure groups.... A kind of
copyright pork-barrel has existed, with exemptions from liability being granted to
favored constituents. Thus, after having created a public performance right, Congress
created a bundle of full and partial exemptions from liability in section 110, the public
performance pork-barrel.56

A criticism of a different order has been voiced by an observer of the
Semiconductor Chip Act of 1984, who states that "a technologically naive
Congress" provided a legislative solution against chip piracy after the
problem had substantially been ameliorated by the natural evolution of
process technology. 5 7 Mitchell Kapor makes the same point in recent
testimony before Representative Kastenmeier's Committee: "[wlith the
52. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-650, 104 Stat 5128 (Dec 1, 1990),
codified at 17 USC § 106A(a) (1990).
53. 136 Cong Rec H13313 (daily ed Oct 27, 1990).
54.

Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v Taito Corp., 883 F2d 275 (4th Cir 1989). This decision is

effectively reversed by 17 USC § 109(e), enacted as part of the Computer Software Rental
Amendments Act of 1990, 104 Stat at 5134. The decision had held that the use of an arcade video
circuit board constituted an infringing public performance of the rights of the seller of the board.
Under the new provision, the owner of a given copy of the circuit board may perform or display the
game without permission of the copyright owner of the game.
55. Hearings on Computers and Intellectual Property at 2 (cited in note 44) (statement of
Representative Kastenmeier).
56. Brown, 70 Minn L Rev at 593 (cited in note 38).
57. Comment, Five Years Without Infringement Litigation under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act:
Unmasking the Spectre of Chip Piracy in an Era of Diverse and Incompatible Process Technologies, 1990 Wis L

Rev 241, 276 (authored by Robert L. Risberg).
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Semiconductor Act ... what has happened is that in some sense it is largely
irrelevant now because the techniques that are used to produce functionally
58
equivalent chips don't involve copying of the masks."
This latter criticism raises both individual and institutional concerns. Was
the Congressman's approach a factor in providing protection after the need
for it had passed? Should the institutional machinery of Congress have been
assigned the task of determining the timeliness of the industry pressure for
protection, given the extended duration of the deliberations? 59 It may be that
this criticism of the Chip Act illustrates the obsolescence of the traditional
congressional mechanism in the face of increasingly complex technology.
Legislating about such matters may require modifications in legislative
60
machinery such as those proposed by Richard Stern.
Moreover, it is not clear that the criticism is correct. Subsequent to the
appearance of this critical article, industry spokespersons as well as
practitioners recorded their disagreement with it by letters to the
Committee. 6 ' If the criticism has some validity, it relates to the larger
congressional problem of legislating about new and complex technology.
Further study is needed to determine whether the statute as enacted was an
anachronism or whether it successfully provided a needed legal framework for
the industry to flourish without conflict.
V
CONCLUSION

The evidence reviewed above establishes Representative Kastenmeier's
mastery of both the doctrinal and practical aspects of copyright. The case is
made that he should be honored as a distinguished public servant. His record
reflects both a concern for the public interest and a sensitivity to the needs of
the constituent groups of copyright law.
This laudatory assessment is reinforced by his post-congressional conduct.
While a serving member of Congress, Representative Kastenmeier was always
scrupulous in avoiding the semblance of impropriety. In his present capacity,
he adheres to the highest ethical traditions by refusing to engage in private
practice or consulting about these matters. In this way, he continues to
provide a model of the best kind of public service.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to participate in this festschrift in
Representative Kastenmeier's honor.
58. Hearings on Computers and Intellectual Property at 247 (cited in note 44).
59. For a complete review of the background of this legislation, see Richard H. Stern,
Semiconductor Chip Protection 32-41 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).
60. Id.
61. Hearings on Computers and Intellectual Property at 949-58 (cited in note 44). Appendix 4
to these hearings contains copies of letters to Representative Kastenmeier from the Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, the Register of Copyrights, intellectual property lawyers, as well as industry
people in response to his earlier letter requesting their opinions on the efficacy of the Chip Act.
These responses uniformly attest to the value of the statute.

